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Romanian.Autonomy and Arms Control Policies 
David S. Mason* 
Romania has proved to be an interesting case study of the limits of 
autonomy within the Soviet bloc. Romania's foreign policy has become 
increasingly independent of Soviet dictates over the last fifteen years, 
while domestic controls have remained as rigid as any in Eastern Europe. 
There have been a number of cases where the Romanians have indicated 
in dramatic fashion their distance from Soviet foreign policy: their 
refusal to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute; their recognition of West 
Gennany in 1967; and their unwillingness to participate in Warsaw Pact 
military exercises or the intervention in Czechoslovakia. 
Less well known is Romania's unorthodox position on arms control 
and disannament, particularly with respect to European security. 
Romania has been East Europe's most outspoken critic of the anns race, 
and assigns equal blame to the superpowers for their inability or 
unwillingness to moderate this race. President Ceausescu and his 
representatives have proposed numerous, detailed, and far reaching 
plans for military disengagement and disannament in Europe. And 
Romania has played an active and independent role in United Nations 
and other multilateral anns control forums. 
Romania's geostrategic position helps explain its anns control and 
disannament policies. As a small state, concerned about maintaining its 
sovereignty in the shadow of a great power, and fearful of the 
possibility of a major war between the superpowers on European soil, 
Romania has a major stake in anns control, especially on the European 
continent. To reduce annaments, especially nuclear ones, would not only 
minimize the likelihood and consequences of a European war, but would 
provide greater equality for the smaller powers by reducing the military 
prerogatives of the big ones. 
Romania's policies on anns control may be viewed as a means by 
which that country has tried to implement its own vision of a desirable 
world order. This vision includes a greater role and autonomy for smaller 
states in the international arena, a decreased use of force in relations 
among states, a reduction in the importance of military blocs in 
international politics, and a consequent reduction in the predominance 
• BuUer University, Indianapolis 
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of security issues in such relations. 
Many of Romania's foreign policy activities may be seen as instru­
ments to achieve these goals. These include increased diplomatic and 
trade relations with Western and Third World states, increased participa­
tion in international organizations and multilateral forums, and in­
creased propaganda, diplomacy, and activity in arms control and 
disarmament. 
For Romania to achieve its goals would be to allow ita greater 
measure of autonomy, and to reduce its dependence on the Soviet 
Union. In some respects, Romania seems to be following Marshall 
Singer's prescription for Weak States in a World oj Powers, where he 
argues that 'power rests as much, or more, on the ability to attract as it 
does on the ability to coerce.'l Romania's power of coercion vis a vis any 
state is quite small, so it has utilized diplomacy and trade as a means of 
'attracting' other states to it. Singer identifies the three components of 
power as wealth, organization, and status. Again, in the absence of any 
great advantages in the first two, Romania has concentrated on the latter 
in its diplomatic activities, and witlI some degree of success. Singer 
counsels tlIe weak states to diversify the powers upon which they depend, 
and to expand 'the degree of political consultation and accommodation' 
with other weak states2 Romania has also done this, as will be seen 
below. The result is that Romania does seem to have moved from 
dependence on the Soviet Union toward interdependence, a much more 
stable and beneficial relationship for both, in Singer's view. 
Romania's World View 
Romania has proposed a 'new world order' in which all states are 
sovereign, independent, autonomous, and cooperative. Romania rejects 
supranational institutions, and stresses the importance of the national 
state, which 'has remained and will long remain an important motive 
force of social and political growth, of progress on a domestic and world 
scale.'J The concepts of sovereignty and autonomous development have 
been important themes in Romanian foreign policy since the early 1960s, 
when two issues were driving Romania apart from the Soviet Union. 
The first dispute was over Khrushchev's plan to increa.se the 
supranational functions of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) by calling for a 'socialist division of labor' in Eastern Europe, 
which would have required Romania to emphasize light industry and 
agricultural production. Romania rejected this formulation, and continued 
with its own economic plans for rapid industrialization. The second issue 
was the increasingly vitriolic Sino-Soviet dispute. Romania opposed the 
open airing of these differences and tried to play a mediating role 
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between the two states at a number of communist party conferences in 
1959 and afterwards. 
In 1964, the Romanian Party leadership went public with its own 
criticism of the Soviets and their efforts to dominate the world of 
communist states. In a dramatic 'Statement on the Stand of the 
Romanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the International 
Communist and Working-Class Movement,' adopted by the Party's 
Central Committee in April 1964, the Romanian Party called on the 
CPSU and the CCP to avoid a split in the world communist movement 
and suggested that all the socialist countries should participate in the 
CMEA. The Statement also asserted the right of each socialist country to 
its own form of development, rejected the supranational functions of 
CMEA and stressed the importance of national independence, sover­
eignty, and noninterference in the affairs of other states.4 
Romania's emphasis on sovereignty and independence is reflected in 
its opposition to 'bloc politics,' the 'policy of diktat,' and the continued 
domination of the small powers by the big. While Romania remains a 
member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), it has substantially 
reduced its participation in that organization. The Romanian position on 
blocs was made clear by President Ceausescu in a 1966 speech: 
military blocs and the existence of military bases and of troops on 
the territory of other states are barriers in the path of collaboration 
among the peoples. The existence of blocs, as well as the sending of 
troops to other countries, is an anachronism inconsistent with the 
independence and national sovereignty of peoples and nonnal 
relations among states.s 
This position has led Romania to call for the abolition of all military 
blocs. It should be noted that the official Warsaw Pact position is also for 
the 'simultaneous' dismantling of WTO and NATO. The difference 
in the Romanian and Soviet WTO view of military blocs is that while 
the fOIDler finds fault with the system of blocs and bloc politics, the 
latter focuses on NATO as the primary obstacle to cooperation among 
states.6 
Romania's emphasis on sovereignty, and its criticism of the military 
blocs, has also led it to appeal for a reduction of the use of force in 
interstate relations. At the 12th Party Congress in 1979, for example, 
Ceausescu called for 'total elimination of the policy offorce and diktat in 
international life, the elimination of interference in the domestic affairs 
ofother states, and the policy of spheres ofinfluence.'7 
From the Romanian point of view, of course, the main violators of 
these nOIDlS are the big powers. In fact, as the Romanian delegate to the 
u.N. Disarmament Committee pointed out, the most damaging trends in 
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international affairs are caused, in part, 'by the intensification of the 
policy of domination and interference in the internal affairs of other 
states [and] the consolidation of spheres of inftuence.'8 The Romanian 
Party opposed not only the threat or use of force in international politics, 
but also the 'import or export of revolution or counter-revolution.'9 
The Romanian criticism of the big powers is most specific in terms of 
their military policies. They find the policies of exporting arms, 
establishing foreign military bases, and stationing troops in other 
countries to be both destabilizing of the international system, and 
exploitative of the recipient states. Ion Nicolae, writing in the foreign 
affairs weekly Lumea, finds that the deployment of troops and bases on 
foreign territories 'causes insecurity, tension, portends war, infringes the 
host states' independent policies, and stimulates arms proliferation.' 
Nicolae also asserts that: 
The supply of weapons along with the assignment of military 
instructors and advisors are assets the military powers use to gain 
domineering positions in the importing states' economic and 
political life, and tutor these states' foreign policy in conformity 
with the suppliers' interests. 10 
It should be noted here that these Romanian assertions are different 
from similar Soviet ones in that they do not assign blame exclusively to 
the Western imperialist powers, as the Soviets do. The Romanians do not 
explicitly identify the Soviets as being at fault here, of course, but neither 
do they specifically exclude tlIem from the category of ,big power' 
Romania has been evenhanded in its criticism of the big powers for 
the use of force in international relations. During the Vietnam war, 
Ceausescu was harshly critical of American policy. But Romania did not 
participate in the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
and boldly criticized that action too. More recently Romania, unlike the 
other bloc states, refused to express support for the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan, and abstained in the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution criticizing the Soviet action. And with the beginning of unrest 
in Poland in the summer of 1980, the Romanian Party daily Scinteia 
asserted that the problems 'can and must be solved by the Polish 
people ... with no outside interference.... The Polish nation has clearly 
stated its policy pOinting out that by no means does it wish or want 
others to solve its problems.'ll 
Romania's appeal for a reduction in the use of force and intimidation 
by the big powers ·has been accompanied by an argument for a greater 
role in international affairs for small and medium sized powers. Romania 
complains about the dominance of the big powers, but also asserts that 
the influence of the big states is shrinking and that the small and medium 
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sized states no longer need 'to play the role of pawns in the service of the 
big imperialist powers.'12 Corneliu Bogdan even quotes such Western 
writers as Alastair Buchan and Klaus Knorr on the growing capacity of 
the small sta tes to defy the big ones. 13 
Romania has made a concerted effort to achieve equal status for 
smaller powers, particularly in international forums, and greater partici­
pation for such states outside of existing blocs. Romania played a major 
and leading role in procedural jockeying for full and equal participation 
for all states 'outside of military alliances' at the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe in 1973; at the Vienna negotiations on 
mutual force reductions; and at the U.N. Disarmament Committee in 
1979. 
Instruments of Romanian Policy 
Romania has adopted a number of foreign policy instruments in pursuit 
of the goals outlined above. These include reduced participation in and 
dependence on the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance, an expansion of diplomatic and trade relations with non­
communist countries, increased participation in international organiza­
tions and other multilateral forums, and increased emphasis on arms 
control and disarmament proposals and activities. While the last of these 
is the focus of this paper, the others provide a context for Romanian 
arms control policies, and will be reviewed briefly below. 
Romania has gradually reduced its involvement in Soviet bloc 
activities since the mid-1960s. As noted above, the first major point of 
dispute between Romania and the Soviet Union was supranational 
economic planning within CMEA. Romania rejected Khrushchev's plan 
for the Romanian economy, continued with its own economic plans, and 
gradually reduced its trade dependence on its communist allies. By the 
1970s, Romania's proportion of trade within CMEA was the smallest of 
any member of that organization. 
With the death of Gheorghiu-Dej, and Nicolae Ceausescu's accession 
to leadership in March 1965, Romania's challenges to the Soviet Union 
began to spill into the military sphere and intrude on Romania's position 
within the WTO. In the years 1966-1969 Romania initiated unilateral 
reductions in its armed forces, reduced the length of compulsory military 
service, called for abolition of the military blocs, reduced the size of the 
Soviet military mission in Bucharest, criticized the dominant role of the 
Soviets in the WTO, refused to participate in joint WTO maneuvers, 
and refused to allow such exercises on Romanian soil. 14 
Romania has continued these policies affecting its military posture and 
its relationship with the WTO, but also began in the middle 1960s to 
2 
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adopl stances on major foreign policy issues thal were quite independent 
of the Soviet and WTO line. In 1967, Romania became the first bloc state 
to establish diplomatic relations with Wesl Germany. The same year, 
Romania was the only East European state not to sever relations wilh 
Israel after the June War. As already nOled, Romania did not participate 
in the Warsaw Pacl intervention in Czechoslovakia, and harsWy 
criticized that action. 
Romania's independent position in foreign affairs has required it to 
become more self-sufficient and autonomous in the military realm. This 
point should not be made too much of, since Romania remains a 
member of the Warsaw Pact, attends most Pact meetings, and signs and 
expresses agreement with most of the documents that issue from that 
organization. But within these limits, the Ceausescu leadership has tried 
to become bolh less dependent on the Soviet Union for military 
protection, and better able to fend off erstwhile allies if it becomes 
necessary. This has posed something of a dilemma for the regime, since it 
has also persislently called for a reduction of force levels and military 
expendilures in Europe, and has tried to set an example in this regard, as 
will be discussed below. The result is that Romania has reduced the size 
of its regular armed forces and military budget, while at the same time it 
has built up its own production of military equipment and developed 
local and guerilla defenses for use in the event of an outside attack. 
Romania's military spending as a percentage of government spending 
and as a percentage of GNP is the smallest of the WTO, and its armed 
forces, as a percentage of eligible males, are also the smallest in the 
Pact.!5 The country's armed forces declined in size from 1965 to 1979, 
and in the last few years the government claims to have made cuts in 
defense expenditures as well. One result of this, whether intended or not, 
is that the Romanian military has become the least useful to the Soviet 
Union, strictly in numerical and technological terms. At the same time, 
to relieve itself of total dependence on the Soviet Union, Romania began 
production of light arms and military goods in the late 1960s, such that 
by 1975, Romania claimed to be producing 60% of the equipment 
necessary for its armed forces. There has also been a diversification of the 
sources of arms imports and production, with the purchase of American 
jet aircraft for military transport, and agreements with the British and 
West Germans for the production of transport aircraft, with the French 
for Alouette III helicopters and with the Yugoslavs for Orao fighter and 
ground attack aircraft.16 
The corollary to all of this is the system of total national defense, 
which is modeled on the Yugoslav practice. The origins for this go back 
to August 21, 1968, the day of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, 
when Ceausescu announced the formation of an armed patriotic guard 
ROMANIAN AUTONOMY AND ARMS CONTROL POLl( 
of some 100,000. The system was formalized in t 
which provides for an 'all horizons' defense, loc; 
the event of attack, and the decentralization c 
wartime.!7 A 1979 'Decree on the Operation 
Units in Wartime' provides for decentralized C( 
well.ls So, according to The Military Balanl 
proportionately the smallest military force (l8( 
has even in absolute terms, by far the largest 
for~es (737,000; much larger than that of eithe 
Union) and the third largest number ofreservisl 
Union and Poland.19 
Romania's efforts to dissociate itself from th 
WTO have led it to diversify its diplomatic and 
the early 1960s, Romania found some room for 
the Soviet Union and China, and managed ra 
mediating role in that dispute. As it became cl 
could be of little help to the Romanians, and 
Europe were reduced, Romania began to expo 
West. By 1974, almost half of Roman.ia's tra( 
countries. By 1975, Romania had achIeved m 
with the United States, and there were rumors 
. 20purchase armaments from Western countnes. 
an agreement with Canada to purchase the firs 
CANDU nuclear reactors. 
But by this time, the era of detente had air' 
useful to the West, consequently reducing R 
itself away from the Soviet bloc by means of th 
the middle 1970s, Romania began to associate 
the developing and non-aligned countries of thl 
1972 Party Conference Romania was fo~ally 
nation, and in February 1976, Romarua wa 
World's Group of 77. Romania's foreign trade 
grew from 4% of the total in 1?60 to ?ver .H 
international meetings. Romama has Identlfl 
participated in the private meetings of, the non 
rather than those of the Warsaw Pact.2! 
Romania has also gained worldwide visibilit 
in both bilateral and multilateral dip10mac~ 
Romanian media report on bilateral comn 
summits, usually featuring President Cea~~ 
committed itself heavily to participation 11 
intergovernmental organizations, and internat 
Romania became the first eastern bloc mel 
ARMS CONTROL 
jor foreign policy issues that were quite independent 
'0 line. In 1967, Romania became the first bloc state 
.tic relations with West Germany. The same year, 
lly East European state not to sever relations with 
War. As already noted, Romania did not participate 
ct intervention in Czechoslovakia, and harshly 
ildent posi tion in foreign affairs has required it to 
fficient and autonomous in the military realm. This 
: made too much of, since Romania remains a 
lW Pact, attends most Pact meetings, and signs and 
with most of the documents that issue from that 
hin these limits, the Ceausescu leadership has tried 
s dependent on the Soviet Union for military 
:r able to fend off erstwhile allies if it becomes 
)sed something of a dilemma for the regime, since it 
called for a reduction of force levels and military 
)e, and has tried to set an example in this regard, as 
w. The result is that Romania has reduced the size 
)rces and military budget, while at the same time it 
production of military equipment and developed 
Inses for use in the event of an outside attack. 
spending as a percentage of government spending 
If GNP is the smallest of the WTO, and its armed 
le of eligible males, are also the smaHest in the 
/irmed forces declined in size from 1965 to 1979, 
ears the government claims to have made cuts in 
lS well. One result of this, whether intended or not, 
military has become the- least useful to the Soviet 
ericaI and technological terms. At the same time, 
dependence on the Soviet Union, Romania began 
p-s and military goods in the late 1960s, such that 
aimed to be producing 60% of the equipment 
forces. There has also been a diversification of the 
.s and production, with the purchase of American 
, transport, and agreements with the British and 
production of transport aircraft, with the French 
Iters and with the Yugoslavs for Orao fighter and
; 
of this is the system of total national defense, 
e Yugoslav practice. The origins for this go back 
day of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, 
\nced the formation of an armed patriotic guard 
ROMANIAN AUTONOMY AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES 
of some 100,000. Tlle system was formalized in the Defense Law of 1972, 
which provides for an 'all horizons' defense, local and guerilla actions in 
the event of attack, and the decentralization of military command in 
wartime.J7 A 1979 'Decree on the Operation of Militarized Socialist 
Units in Wartime' provides for decentralized control of the economy as 
well. 18 So, according to The Military Balance, while Romania has 
proportionately the smallest military force (180,000) in East Europe, it 
has, even in absolute terms, by far the largest number of paramilitary 
forces (737,000; much larger than that of either the GDR or the Soviet 
Union) and the third largest number of reservists, behind only the Soviet 
Union and Poland .19 
Romania's efforts to dissociate itself from the Soviet Union and the 
WTO have led it to diversify its diplomatic and economic ties as well. In 
the early 1960s, Romania found some room for itself in the gap between 
the Soviet Union and China, and managed rather effectively to playa 
mediating role in that dispute. As it became clear, however, that China 
could be of little help to the Romanians, and as Cold War tensions in 
Europe were reduced, Romania began to expand its contacts with the 
West. By 1974, almost half of Romania's trade was with the Western 
countries. By 1975, Romania had achieved most favored nation status 
with the United States, and there were rumors that it was attempting to 
purchase armaments from Western countries.2° In 1978, Romania signed 
an agreement with Canada to purchase the first of several 600 megawatt 
CANDU nuclear reactors. 
But by this lime, the era of detente had already made Romania less 
useful to the West, consequently reducing Romania's ability to lever 
itself away from the Soviet bloc by means of the Western states. Thus, in 
the middle 1970s, Romania began to associate itself more and more with 
the developing and non-aligned countries of the Third World. In the July 
1972 Party Conference Romania was formally identified as a developing 
nation, and in February 1976, Romania was admitted to the Third 
World's Group of 77. Romania's foreign trade with developing countries 
grew from 4% of the total in 1960 to over 18% in 1976. And in some 
international meetings, Romania has identified itself with, and often 
participated in the private meetings of, the nonaligned and neutral states 
rather than those of the Warsaw Pact.21 
Romania has also gained worldwide visibility by playing an active role 
in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Almost every day, the 
Romanian media report on bilateral communiques, agreements, or 
summits, usually featuring President Ceausescu. Romania has also 
committed itself heavily to participation in international meetings, 
intergovernmental organizations, and international agreements. In 1972, 
Romania became the first eastern bloc member of the International 
19 
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Mon~tary Fund and the World Bank. It has been especially active in 
multIlateral forums on arms control and security, including the Helsinki 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its followup 
sessIOns; the Vienna negotiations on mutual force reductions in Europe; 
and the various U.N. disarmament foroms. 
All of these foreign policy actions have brought Romania closer to its 
desired position in the international political arena. Romania has been 
able to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact 
allies, t.o. make them le.ss dependent on Romania, and to establish greater 
recogllltIOn of the regIme as a relatively autonomous state in a divided 
Eur.ope. These activities are complemented and enhanced by Romania's 
P?SlhOn on ~rms control and disaonament. These policies also may be 
vlew~d as lllstruments of Romanian foreign pOlicy, in that they 
cont~~ute to the country's long teon and short teon foreign policy goals. 
But It IS also apparent that Ceausescu and the Romanian leadership view 
an end to the arms race as an important goal in itself. 
Romanian Views on the Arms Race and Anns Control 
The im portance of disarmament in Romanian foreign policy is evident 
from the frequent references to this goal in the speeches of Ceausescu 
and other political leaders. The President has said, for example. that 
one of the historic missions of socialism and communism, besides 
the liberation of peoples from any domination and oppression, is 
that of saving mankind from a new war, of achieving disarmament 
and, first of all, nuclear disarmament. 22 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, Romania's criticisms of the arms race 
and appeals for disarmament did not always reflect a detailed under­
standing of the dynamics of the arms race and the political and technical 
complexities of aons control negotiations. Of late, however, this no 
longer seems to be the case, perhaps partially because of Romania's own 
participation in disarmament negotiations at the United Nations and in 
the Mutual Force Reduction talks in Vienna. Academic studies in 
particular increasingly demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of 
issues of strategy, proliferation, and arms control. Most of these rely 
heavily on the standard Western sources of data, such as SIPRI and nss, 
and seem well acquainted with the major Western, particularly Ameri­
can, studies in this area.23 
The Romanians see the main cause of the arms race as a structural 
on~, resulti~g from tlle existence of competitive military blocs and the 
actIOn-reactIOn phenomenon. Unlike the Soviet Union, Romania does 
not put the main responsibility on NATO, the United States, and 
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'aggressive imperialist circles.' Nicolae Moraru, for example, writes: 
The main and fundamental cause underlying the arms race in 
post-war Europe resides in the structuring of European security in 
the old and noxious policy of the us:e and/or threat of force ... and 
in the so-called 'balance of Eurostrategic forces' which entailed a 
dynamic and exponential growth in national military potentials.24 
Gheorghe Dolgu, similarly non-judgmental about the initiator and 
perpetuator of the arms race, identifies five factors that allow it to 
continue: technological improvements, leading to an action-reaction 
cycle; new military doctrines which envisage the use of nuclear weapons 
on the battlefield; the competition for a preemptive strike capability; 
socio-economic factors, such as the military-industrial complex; and the 
effort to form spheres of domination.25 
Romanian delegates to international meetings are also evenhanded in 
assigning blame for the arms race. The Romanian representative to the 
U.N. Disarmament Committee, for example, found that the impasse in 
international disarmament negotiations was between the 'major nuclear 
powers' and the non-nuclear states and not, as the Soviets would have it, 
a result of intransigence by the Western states. 26 The Soviets, as might be 
expected, are not happy with this kind of approach to the question. In 
the same forum, Soviet ambassador Troyanovsky complained about 
assertions, 'particularly in this Organization' about 'the equal responsibi­
lity of the great powers for the arms race.'27 
In discussing the consequences of the arms race, the Party and the 
press typically cite the general negative effect on European security and 
on the global economy, often citing data from Ruth Sivard's World 
Military and Social Expenditures series. In more academic articles, there 
is somewhat more elaboration of the specific effects of the arms race on 
European and Romanian security. Nicolae Moraru, in the article 
mentioned above, identifies several particularly dangerous and destabi­
lizing aspects of the arms race: the possibility that nuclear weapons will 
be used, thus destroying Europe; the development of weapons of 
'limited' collateral destruction and the miniaturization of tactical nuclear 
weapons lowering the nuclear threshold; and the increasingly sophisti­
cated technology of weapons systems making negotiations more diffi­
cul1.28 Romanian writers have also contended that security in Europe 
'does not propose merely the absence of certain conflicts, but presup­
poses the establishment of a broad framework of collaboration and 
cooperation between all countries.'29 The arms race, it is argued, simply 
undermines efforts to build such cooperation. 
While many of Romania's early proposals for disarmament were 
sweeping and non-compromising, its proposals have recently become 
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increasingly specific and detailed. In the United Nations, for example, 
while the Soviets often abstain on specific arms control resolutions 
because they are too limited or narrow, Romania votes for virtually 
every resolution in this area, including some which are meant to be seen 
as alternatives to each other. The Romanians emphasize the need for 
immediate, concrete, and partial measures, believing that general 
disarmament may be some years down the road. As a consequence of 
these different approaches to arms control, the Romanian and Soviet 
delegations often find themselves voting on opposite sides on U.N. 
disarmament resolutions. 
In resolutions on arms control that were adopted (and in which there 
was a vote) at the 33rd Session of the General Assembly (1978-9), 
Romania voted yes on all 22 such resolutions, while the Soviets (and the 
other WIO states) abstained or voted against on eleven of them. In the 
34th Session the next year, Romania and the Soviet Union voted 
together on eleven resolutions and against each other on eight-30 
As is apparent, Romanian views on the arms race and arms control are 
quite different from those of the Soviet Union, just as their views on 
other foreign policy issues differ. As will be seen in the following section, 
these differences are reflected in the specific arms control proposals that 
the Romanians have put forward over the years. 
Romanian Disarmament and Arms Control Proposals 
Like other Warsaw Pact states Romania has long favored a number of 
arms control measures, ranging from limitations on troop movements 
along borders, to total disarmament and a prohibition of the use of force 
in the conduct of interstate relations. Like all such proposals, they are a 
mixture of propaganda and serious intent. But it seems from the prom­
inence given such proposals by Romanian party officials, diplomats, and 
academics, the sheer persistence with which these proposals are advanced, 
and the important differences between Romanian and WTO proposals, that 
Romania does have a serious interest in arms control. 
The Romanians, like the SOViets, have put forward dozens of arms 
control and disarmament proposals over the years. In the 1960s, 
Romanian proposals largely reflected those of the Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Pact, and therefore tended to be comprehensive. The 1964 Party 
Sta tement, for exampIe, simply expressed support for the Soviet 
proposals for ending the production and eventual destruction of nuclear 
weapons, the dismantling of military bases on foreign territories, and the 
abolition of all armed forces. It also expressed support for the 1960 WTO 
appeal for the banning of the testing of nuclear weapons and for the 
abolition of military blocs. 
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In recent years, Romanian arms control proposals have been advanced 
on their own merits, usually without reference to similar WTO or Soviet 
proposals. Many of the Romanian and WTO proposals are the same, or 
similar, but some are quite different. There are also differences in the 
emphasis that the Romanians or the Soviets give to various proposals. 
The main independent proposals emphasized by the Romanians in 
recent years are for the reduction of military budgets, and the 
establishment of demilitarized zones along national borders. They Ilave 
also appealed for the elimination of military blocs and foreign military 
bases, and for regional nuclear free zones, though these proposals are 
similar to WTO pronouncements. 
The Reduction of Military Budgets 
One of Romania's most frequently and insistently voiced demands in 
recent years has been for the freezing and subsequent reductIon of 
military budgets. These appeals have been especially insistent since tIle 
1978 decisions by NATO and the WTO to increase defense spending, but 
the Romanian proposals in this regard predate those decisions. In 1970, 
Romania proposed to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 
(the recently enlarged Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee) a 
series of disarmament measures, including a proposal for the early 
freeZing and subsequent reduction of the military budgets of all states.31 
Romania put forward a similar proposal at the Helsinki preparatory 
talks for the CSCE in 1973. 
The proposal became a major one for the Romanians, and an 
important and divisive issue between Moscow and Bucharest at the 
meeting of the WTO Heads of State in Moscow in November 1978. The 
NATO Council had just adopted a decision to increase military 
appropriations by each of the member states, and Moscow was calling 
for increased defense spending and tighter military integration in the 
Warsaw Pact.32 Ceausescu refused to go along with these plans, and on 
his return to Romania stated that 'we have undertaken no commitment 
and do not intend to increase our military expenditures.' He expressed 
disapproval of the May NATO decision, but also asserted tIlat the 
socialist countries 'should say a resolute "no" to the arms race' and 
should 'reduce military expenditures, which are a heavy burden on all 
the peoples, including the socialist peoples.'33 Ceausescu went on to state 
the Romanian position on the reduction of military budgets, which has 
remained the formula since that time: 
The starting point should be a freeze on military expenditures, 
troops, and armaments at the level of 1978, which should then be 
gradually cut back at a first stage by at least 10-15 per cent by 
1985.34 
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Ceausescu argued that alllhis was necessary both to reduce international 
tensions and to help end the arms race, and that it was possible because 
the danger of war or military action was not imminent.35 
The Soviet reaction to all of this has been ambivalent. The Russians 
seem initially to have followed the Romanian lead on the reduction of 
military budgets. In 1973, three years after the first Romanian proposal, 
the Soviets introduced into the General Assembly a resolution calling for 
a 10% reduction in military expenditures by each of the permanent 
members of the Security Council, and the allocation of part of the 
released funds for development assistance.36 
. ~ntil 1978, then, the Soviet and Romanian positions were quite 
sunilar. But when Ceausescu refused to go along with the wro budget 
increases, Brezhnev criticized those whose 'demagogic arguments' could 
lead to 'the weakening of our defenses in the face of the growing military 
might of imperialism. '37 Nevertheless, perhaps partially as a compromise 
to the Romanians, the WTO Communique of November 1978 included a 
proposal for the reduction of military budgets 'whether by equal parts, 
percentage, or in absolute terms' and this formula has been repeated in 
subsequent Pact Communiques and in Soviet proposals to the United 
Nations. But the Soviet Union and all the wro states except Romania 
voted against a U.N. General Assembly Resolution adopted in 1978 
which provided for a standard international system of measuring and 
reporting military budgets, and declined to participate in the test of the 
system in 1979.38 
The basic Romanian proposals on military budgets have continued to 
be pressed, both in speeches and in multilateral forums, though there 
have been some elaborations on the theme. At the U.N. Commission on 
Disarmament in May 1979, the 10-15% formula was repeated, but 'with 
considerably bigger reductions for the heavily armed countries.'39 And in 
November 1980, at the U.N. Disarmament Committee, the Romanians 
put forward the proposition that the nuclear states and those most 
heavily armed should be the first to engage in the process of freezing and 
reducing military budgets.4o 
In following its own prescriptions Romania claims to have effected 
major reductions in its own military budget in each of the last three 
years - by some 500 million lei (about 4% of the defense budget) in 1979 
and by nearly 2 billion lei (16%) in 1980.41 In 1979, the savings were 
diverted to increasing state allowances for childreI).. And in the U.N., 
~CTAD and ot?er forums, Romania has no doubt won favor among 
ItS Third World fnends by proposing a Common Development Fund, to 
?e furnished by developed countries' contributions from military spend­
mg, to be used primarily for developing countries with annual per capita 
GNPs of less than $600.42 
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Confidence Building Measures and Restrictions on Military Maneuvers 
While most Romanian arms control proposals are similar to Soviet or 
wro initiatives, on the topic of military maneuvers Romania's sugges­
tions are quite different from anything proposed by its allies, and are not 
mentioned or reflected in WTO documents. Romania's interest in 
military movements and maneuvers has been evident ever since August 
1968. The Romanian delegates at the Helsinki CSCE Conference were 
particularly interested in the CBM (Confidence Building Measures) in 
the final document, which provided for prior notification of any military 
maneuvers of over 25,000 troops within 250 kilometers of national 
frontiers. 43 Romania has also been very active in the military exchanges 
encouraged by the Helsinki agreements. In the exchange of senior 
defense officials between the U.S. and the wro countries between 1975 
and 1979, Romania has had eight such exchanges compared to six for the 
Soviet Union and one for Hungary.44 At the CSCE followup meeting in 
Madrid in December 1980, Romania proposed a Conference on 
Confidence Building and Disarmament in Europe.4S 
There are two unique proposalS in this area put forward by the 
Romanians in recent years: one for a cessation of military maneuvers 
near national borders; and another for a demilitarized zone between 
NATO and the WYO. Romania has periodically suggested tlJat military 
maneuvers in Europe be ended altogether. This was an element in the 
Romanian position at both the Helsinki preparatory conference in 1973 
and at the Geneva Disarmament Committee in 1979. Their somewhat 
more realistic proposal for the ending of military maneuvers on the 
borders of other states was first enunciated at the time of the Soviet inter­
vention in Czechoslovakia but was not systematically developed until the 
late I970s. At the CSCE Review Conference in Belgrade in 1977-8, the 
Romanian proposals included a cessation of multinational maneuvers near 
the frontiers of participating states.46 In Ceausescu's December 1978 speech, 
after the Warsaw Pact meeting calling for closer integration and higher 
military expenditures, he called for reducing and halting military man­
euvers 'and generally all displays of force, in the neighborhood of the 
national borders of other States.'47 Then in 1979, the following proposal was 
advanced at the UN. Special Session on Disarmament: 
a shutdown of military bases in the border area and creation of 
15-20 kilometer wide security belts from the borderline where 
neither troops nor weapons should ever station.48 
The other major proposal in this area is for a demilitarized strip 
between the two blocs. This was first suggested by Ceausescu in his 
December 1978 speech, as follows: 
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It would perhaps be useful to establish a strip between the two 
blocs, stretching on each side, free of all troops and weapons, and 
from which all maneuvers and military displays would be 
banned.49 
In February of 1979, Ceausescu elaborated on this proposal, suggesting 
that the buffer zone should be 80-100 kilometers wide and that only a 
small national force on each side should be located there. This proposal 
was put to the Geneva Disarmament Committee that same month.5o 
Both of these sets of proposals are very different from, and much more 
thoroughgoing than, anything the Soviets have proposed in recent years. 
The Soviet and Warsaw Pact proposals have been much more limited, 
for example, to earlier prior notification of land maneuvers, limitation of 
maneuvers to 50,000 men, and extension of CBM to naval and aerial 
maneuvers, and to the Mediterranean.51 The Romanian proposals, 
understandably, have not even been mentioned by the Soviet Union or 
the other members of the Warsaw Pact. They pertain, of course, to an 
area of utmost sensitivity to Soviet ci.::fense planners, and the implemen­
tation of such measures would severely restrict the intimidating kind of 
maneuvers practiced in and around Czechoslovakia before their inter­
vention there, and on the borders with Poland more recently. This, of 
course, may be precisely why the Romanians have proposed them. 
Dissolving the Military Blocs 
Romania has, since the 1964 Party Statement, persistently called for the 
abolition of all military blocs though, in most respects, its appeals here 
have followed very closely those of the Soviet Union and the WTO. In 
fact, the Warsaw Treaty itself, signed in 1955 in response to the 
integration of West Germany into NATO, states that the Organization 
will be dissolved as soon as NATO is. The appeal for the dissolution of 
the blocs has been renewed periodically by the WTO. In 1966, the 
organization proposed the 'simultaneous' dissolution of existing military 
alliances or, as a first step, the abolition of the military organizations 
within the alliances. This formula was disaggregated and made even less 
demanding in 1978, when the WTO called for dissolution of the military 
organizations 'starting with a mutual reduction of military activity.'52 
Ceausescu repeated this formula in a speech just one month after the 
Pact meeting.53 
Despite the apparent consonance of views on the dissolution of the 
military blocs between Romania and the Soviet Union, there are some 
important differences in both emphasis and motive. As noted above, the 
Romanians have different views from the Soviets on the role of the blocs 
in international affairs, with the former assigning both blocs responsibility 
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for international tensions and the arms race, and the latter vigorously 
asserting the differential effects and purposes of the two alliances. 
Ceausescu's support for pact dissolutions has been more consistent and 
more insistent than that of his WTO allies. He has appealed for 'intense 
activities to reduce the activities of the military pacts' and 'specifiC 
measures aimed at the simultaneous dismantling of those pacts.' He has 
asserted that 'peace can be served not by intensifying the arms race and 
strengthening the military blocs, but by cutting down and dismantling 
the military blocs.'5Q This evenhanded criticism of the blocs wa~ probably 
not what the Soviets had in mind. 
Foreign Troops and Military Bases 
Another frequent Romanian proposal that is similar to, but more 
insistent than, WTO proposals, is for the elimination of foreign military 
bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories to their own 
homelands. These are also long-standing Soviet proposals, going all the 
way back to 1946.55 The Romanian proposals differ from the Soviets, 
however, in three respects: first, their rationale for these proposals is 
different from the Soviets'; second. these appeals have been sustained 
and continuous, while those of the Soviets and WTO have waxed and 
waned; and third. the Romanians have elaborated on these ideas 
somewhat of late, making them slightly different from the extant WTO 
proposals. 
Ceausescu has, a~ noted above, identified military bases and foreign 
troops as anachronisms 'inconsistent with the independence and national 
sovereignty of peoples.'56 The Warsaw Pact position, On the other hand, 
is that while foreign mili tary forces per se are not bad, 'the existence of 
military blocs and military bases on territories of other states, imposed by 
the imperialist forces, constitute an obstacle to cooperation among 
states.'57 The Soviets, after the relinquishment of their bases in China 
and Finland in 1955 and 1956, felt that they had no foreign military 
bases, though Soviet troops remained stationed in the GDR. Hungary 
and Poland and, after 1968. in Czechoslovakia58 That the Romanians do 
not agree with the Soviet definition of foreign military bases is clear from 
their frequent mentioning of the 700 foreign military bases in eighteen 
European countries, Since there are only thirteen European NATO 
states ( one of Which, France. has no foreign bases on its territory), it 
seems that the Romanians view the Soviet forces in WTO countries as 
constituting bases as well. While the Soviets consider the imperialist 
military bases as being obstacles to cooperation, the Romanians take a 
negative view of all military bases which. 'far from protecting the 
respective peoples, are a source of pressure and interference in the 
domestic affairs of the respective countries.'59 
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In terms of continuity and consistency, the Romanian proposals are 
also different from the Soviets'. While the Soviets and the WTO have for 
a long time advocated the abolition of foreign bases and the withdrawal 
of foreign troops, these have not always been prominent in the lexicon of 
Soviet disarmament proposals. While the July 1966 WTO Communique 
called attention to military bases, these proposals gradually disappeared 
as negotiations for the Helsinki conference got under way. During the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet and Pact statements simply called for 
reductions of armed forces in Europe. Not until the November 1978 
WTO meeting was the formula on military bases and foreign troops 
revived. it was repeated in both the 1979 and 1980 WTO Communiques, 
although it was not among the list of proposals made by Brezhnev at the 
26th Party Congress in February 1981. 
For the Romanians, on the other hand, proposals for eliminating 
foreign military bases, or withdrawing foreign troops, or both have been 
voiced continuously since at least the 1964 Party Statement, in official 
speeches and before the U.N. and the CSCE. In 1971, a new twist was 
added in a Romania-Yugoslav joint communique, in which a call for tlIe 
banning of new military bases and new nuclear weapons on foreign 
territory was added to the old formula. 6o In his December 1978 speech, 
Ceausescu included all these elements plus asking for a pledge from 
other states not to accept foreign military bases. His formula, as follows, 
is essentially the one that has been pursued by Romania since then: 
Equally important would be pledges not to station more troops and 
weapons on the territory of other States, and to begin gradually to 
reduce and then withdraw all foreign troops to within their own 
national borders, as well as to dismantle military bases, primarily 
nuclear ones, from the territory of other states; and pledges by all 
the States not to permit foreign bases on their territory .. .61 
Again we see that the Romanian formula is much more specific than the 
WTO's rather cursory mention of 'the dismantling of foreign military 
bases and the withdrawal of troops from other peoples' territories.'62 The 
Romanian proposal is both more serious and more practical, in that is 
contains intermediate steps and gradual measures for achieving the final 
goal. 
Nuclear free zones 
Another proposal that is commonly associated with the Romanians is for 
the creation of a nuclear free zone in the Balkans. In fact, this has not 
been one of the major Romanian interests in recent years, and current 
Romanian ideas on this are similar to those of the Soviets. The first 
proposal of this nature was made by Romanian Prime Minister Stoica in 
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September of 1957, when he suggested a conference to convert the 
Balkans into a 'peace zone'. But he did not at that time explicitly 
mention nuclear weapons.63 This issue was tirst raised on June 6, 1959, 
several days after Soviet Premier Khrushchev, during a visit to Albania, 
proposed creating a zone 'free from missiles and atomic weapons' in the 
Balkans and part of the Adriatic region. This proposal was formally 
conveyed by the Soviet government to six Western governments on June 
25, but they eventually rejected it. In 1963, the Soviets revived the 
initiative for a denuclearized zone in the Mediterranean. But the United 
States was then replacing its missile bases in Greece and Turkey with 
Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, and rejected this proposal as 
well.64 
After this point, the idea of a Balkan nuclear free zone was never a 
major element in the Romanian, or Warsaw Pact, arms control packages. 
The Romanian Party Statement of 1964 did call for denuclearized zones 
in a number of regions, including the Balkans. But the idea of a 
specifically Balkan zone was never supported in official WTO state­
ments6j and the Romanian proposal gradually came to reflect the more 
general Pact policy for nuclear free zones 'in various areas, including 
Europe.'66 In recent speeches on arms control, Ceausescu has not 
mentioned nuclear free zones at all. 
The Romanian retreat on this issue may be due in part to the failure of 
the Khrushchev initiatives and of the Rapacki Plan of 1958 and the 
Gomulka Plan of 1964 for nuclear free zones in Central Europe. But 
there may also have been the feeling that the nuclear free zone plan was 
redundant alongside other Romanian proposals for eliminating foreign 
military bases, especially nuclear ones, for pledges by nuclear states not 
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear ones, and for no new nuclear 
weapons to be introduced in Europe. 
Other Arms Control Issues 
The issues discussed so far are all arms control proposalS which have not 
yet been implemented. There has also been some disagreement between 
the Soviet Union and Romania on arms control agreements that have 
been reached, especially the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and 
the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
The Romanians have been noticeably quiescent on the issue of nuclear 
weapons testing, probably because of their reluctance to take sides on an 
issue that divides the Soviet Union and China. The PRC has not signed 
the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, and this has been a source of irritation to 
Moscow. While the Romanian Communist Party did mention the 
banning of the testing of nuclear weapons in its 1964 Statement, it has 
not done so since. The Romanians have refrained from supporting the 
I 
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Soviet proposals for a complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests and, 
more recently, for a one year moratorium on such testing6?, presumably 
also In deference to China. 
On the No~-Proliferati.on Treat~ (NPT), Romania has been skeptical 
from the begmmng, feehng that It was biased in favor of the nuclear 
powers. In a major speech on foreign policy in 1967, Ceausescu 
expressed reservations with non-proliferation that many non-nuclear 
powers shared: 
Without preci.se, firm, and efficient measures on the part of all 
states f~r ceasIn? t~e p~oduction of nuclear weapons, for reducing 
and ultImately hqUldatmg the existing stockpiles, nonproliferation 
would not only fail to secure progress along the way of liquidating 
the danger of nuclear war, but would bring about its indefinite 
perpetuation.68 
Ceausescu also wanted assurances that the NPT would allow unres­
tricte~ access to nuclear energy and that the non-nuclear states would get 
secunty guarantees that nuclear weapons would not be used against 
them or used to menace them. 
Romania'.s unhappiness with the eventual treaty was such that it 
refused to sign a WTO Declaration endorsing the Treaty, the first time 
that a ~O .document was not unanimously accepted.69 And Romania 
delayed slgrung the Treaty until February of 1970. Since that time ~omania has complained that the nuclear powers have not kept thei; 
sIde of the deal, have contmued vertical proliferation, and have 
obstru~ted the transfer of peaceful nuclear energy to non-nuclear 
countnes, partIcularly developing countries'?o One can infer that these 
last cha.rges are aimed particularly at the Soviet Union, especially since 
Romama has recently contracted with Canada to purchase nuclear 
reactors.?1 
Romania's Long Term Foreign Policy Goals and Arms Control 
Roma~a:s a~s cont~ol policies have been an important tool of 
Romama s foreIgn pohcy. They have helped Romania achieve some 
autonomy within the Soviet bloc, and have contributed to each of the 
four major elements of Romania's vision of a desirable world order: 
sovereignty an.d. independence for all states, a reduction of the impor­
tance of the military blocs, a decline in the use or threat of force, and an 
enhanced role for small states in international politics. 
Romania's emphasis on sovereignty, independence, and the impor­
tance of the natlOnal state has been supported by its arms control 
proposals and policies in two important ways. First of all, manY' of the 
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country's arms control proposals are aimed at trying to preserve the 
territorial integrity of states. The arguments against military blocs, 
foreign military bases and troops, and the proposals for demilitarized 
zones are all aimed at restoring the sovereignty of European states, 
particularly the weaker ones. Second, the very nature of Romania's 
maverick position on arms control issues fortifies its own independence 
in foreign and military poliCY, and acts as an example to other states. 
Romania's rejection of supranational coordination of military maneuvers 
and military spending is also a demonstration and affirmation of its own 
independence and sovereignty. 
Ceausescu's opposition to 'bloc pOlitics' and the domination of the big 
powers has also been supported by his arms control and military policies. 
Most importantly, of course, Romania has removed itself from full 
participation in its own bloc by refusing to participate in WTO 
maneuvers or allow such maneuvers on Romanian soil; by refusing to go 
along with several WTO initiatives (such as the NPT, initially, and 
increases in military spending); and by abstaining from major WTO 
actions such as the intervention in Czechoslovakia. 
Romania has expressed its differences with the Soviet Union On the 
purposes and usefulness of military blocs and has insistently advocated 
their abolition. Most importantly, perhaps, Romania differs from its 
allies on the need to strengthen the military component of the Warsaw 
Pact. While the rest of the Pact has increased military spending and 
capabilities, Romania has cut back in these areas, and has called upon its 
allies to do likewise. Romania has built up its civilian defense force 
(which is modeled on that of the Yugoslavs), which is useful only for 
defensive operations against an enemy invading Romanian territory. Il 
has cut back, at the same time, on the very forces that would be most 
useful for the rapid, mobile, and offensive actions the Soviets envisage in 
a European conflict. Romania has then, by both word and deed. 
removed itself from the arena of East-West conflict. 
Most of these policies also support Romania's position on the 
elimination of the use of force in international politics. Romania is 
particularly concerned about the possible use of nuclear weapons in 
Europe, and sees in their use the probable destruction of the continent. 
Romanian commentators also contend that a major conflict in Europe is 
likely to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, Romania believes, 
the European states should try to avoid stepping on to even that first 
rung of the conflict ladder, and must avoid altogether the use of force in 
their relations. 
In line with this, Romania has argued for efforts to reduce both the 
means of conflict, and the occasions that might lead to conflict. 
Romania's proposals for reduction in military budgets, conventional 
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armaments, military bases, and nuclear weapons support the former, and 
the proposals for nuclear free zones, demilitarized borders, and increased 
reliance on diplomacy support the latter. 
The commitment to diplomacy is also evident from Romania's record 
on arms control deliberations, which demonstrate that it is committed as 
much to the process of arms control negotiations as it is to the outcome. 
In Romania's view, the primary drawback of the arms race is that it 
i?creases .tension ~nd reduces the possibility for international coopera­
tIon, particularly III Europe. Thus, Romania often emphasizes limited 
measures in arms control, rather than the grandiose schemes often put 
forward by the Soviet Union. While the outcomes from such limited 
accords might not be as dramatic, they can develop some measure of 
trust and lead to further negotiations. Romania has expressed support 
for the SALT Treaty, and for Brezhnev's October 1979 initiatives in this 
kind of language. Romania's commitment to, and involvem'ent in, 
multilateral forums on arms control, is also a measure of its interest in 
the process of arms control negotiations. The Romanian leaders clearly 
hope tha t negotiations on arms, and the conclusion of a network of arms 
control agreements, will reduce the incentive of states to rely on force in 
their international behavior. 
Romania's argument for a more visible role for small states in the 
international arena has been supported in three ways by its arms control 
policies. ~irst, Romania has increased its own autonomy by demonstrating, 
m a public and visible fashion, its distance from the Soviet Union on some 
a~s control issues. It should be emphasized here that Romania's policies in 
thIS area are not so much defiant as simply autonomous. Romania has, in 
fact, supported most of the major Soviet initiatives in arms controL and has 
~ttached its signature to all of the Warsaw Pact communiques on these 
ISsues. The only Soviet initiative that the Romanians have not supported for 
political reasons is the comprehensive test ban. 
On the other hand, Romania has not simply toed the Soviet line on 
arms control issues. Some Romanian proposals, most especially those on 
demilitarized zones on the borders of states and between the two blocs, 
have been totally independent of the Soviet line. Others have been 
similar to Soviet or WTO proposals, but have differed in the details or 
the emphasis given the proposal. There have also been substantial 
differences in the context within which the Romanians and the Soviets 
place .various arms control initiatives. The Soviets are much more likely 
to aSSIgn the blame for the arms race to the United States and NATO. 
Romania, in refusing to be so specific, by implication also faults the 
Soviet Union. 
There are two further ways by which Romania's arms control policies 
have enhanced the role of small states. By the sheer persistence with 
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which Ceausescu has pursued anns control issues, he has given Romania 
an active, visible and exemplary role as a small state in the international 
arena. And in many of these international forums Romania has tried to 
enhance the role of all small states by arguing for universal and equal 
participation by all states on important anns control and security issues. 
Romania's use of arms control as an instrument of foreign policy has 
implications for other states as well. Weak states can affect the behavior 
of the Powers, by hammering away at policies which the Powers claim to 
pursue. This may even affect the policies of the Powers. While it does 
seem that in most cases the Soviets have simply let the Romanians go 
their own way, the prospect of a dissenter within the Warsaw Pact on a 
major arms control initiative must surely temper Soviet proposals. And, 
indeed, it does appear that many of the Warsaw Pact statements on arms 
control have touched on issues or included wording likely to please the 
Romanians, suggesting some measure of bargaining and compromise 
within the organization. 
The relationship between Romania and the Soviet Union is similar in 
some respects to that between the United States and its NATO allies, 
particularly on anns control issues. Just as Romania has pressed harder 
on some anns limitations measures than the Soviets have, and has been 
reluctant to join the chorus denouncing the other side, some of the West 
European states have been reluctant partners within NATO. The recent 
NATO decision to emplace Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, for 
example, was paired with a commitment to negotiation on theater anns 
limitations, largely at European insistence. Belgium and the Netherlands 
have even delayed their decision on accepting these missiles, pending 
evidence of progress on theater anns control. 
Historically, the Romanian position within WTO most resembles the 
French wi thin NATO. France withdrew from military participation in 
NATO in 1966, and closed down NATO bases. Romania took similar 
action with respect to the wro in the same period. In fact, Romania 
may be deliberately patterning its behavior on the French, particularly 
on fonner President de Gaulle. Ceausescu's interest in all-European 
cooperation and his enthusiasm for the nation-state, is similar to de 
Gaulle's. Romania's 'all horizons' defense law of 1972 recalls France's 
'taus azimuts' defense plan adopted in the late 1960s when France was 
disengaging from NATO. And after Romania's disagreement with its 
Pact allies on military spending in December 1978, a Scinteia editorial 
pointedly and approvingly mentioned de Gaulle's 1966 decision on 
NATO.n 
So just as the European allies of the United States have often 
tempered American policies, and required a somewhat less dogmatic 
view of communism and the Soviet Union, Romania may help to temper 
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Soviet proposals. To the extent that these efforts by small states to 
promote arms control are successful, even more benefits rebound to 
them. The Europeans are, after all, the ones who have the most to lose in 
the event of another major war. Romania has emphasized this time and 
again. In an era in which superpowers are about to remilitarize, the best 
hope of peace may rest with the weak but sensible states. 
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